We study the implications of a stockout constraint in a dynamic general equilibrium model, which can explain both standard business cycle and inventory facts. Under this constraint, inventories and demand are complements in generating sales, and hence the optimal level of inventories increases in expected demand. We show that the inventory to sales ratio is both persistent and countercyclical because the cost of carrying inventories is mainly determined by the interest rate. We use this model to disentangle output and sales, by matching the key inventory moments, and find that preference and productivity shocks are equally important in the data. Finally, we assess whether improvements in inventory management can explain the Great Moderation. We find that, although improvements in inventory management can reduce the need for inventory holdings, which decreases output volatility relative to sales volatility, lower levels of inventories actually increases sales volatility. Because these two effects offset each other, a change in inventory management does not change output volatility to any great extent.
Introduction
Inventories represent the difference between production and sales and thus, broadly speaking, place a wedge between the demand and supply sides of the economy and this wedge actually continues to be of great importance in the analysis of business cycles.
1 Table 1 shows the contribution of inventory investment to the output decline in the most recent, and largest, postwar recession in [2007] [2008] [2009] was some 33% and, although smaller than the average postwar contribution, can hardly be said to be insignificant. Accordingly inventory accumulation has been placed at the center of the production and sales adjustment process but despite an extensive literature on inventories, most existing theoretical studies of inventories focus only on a firm or industry level analysis and there are relatively few general equilibrium analyses. 2 The motivation of our work is thus 1 Much early quantitative work was directed towards understanding the nature and causes of the inventory cycle. Schumpeter's (1939) analysis of the business cycle placed considerable weight on Kitchin's (1923) observation of cycles being associated with unintended changes in inventories. This point was followed by Metzler (1941) who formulated a model of the duration of inventory cycle and as an accelerator mechanism in final output. And inventories continue to account for a large share of GDP fluctuations, particularly in recessions. For example, Fitzgerald (1997) reports that "changes in inventory investment are, on average, more than one-third the size of quarterly changes in real GDP over the post-war period." See also Blinder and Maccini (1991) . 2 To name a few, Hornstein and Sarte (2001) , Boileau and Letendre (2004) and Jung and Yun (2005) for inventory analysis in a sticky price environment, and Fisher and Hornstein (2000) for the (S,s) model. See below for Khan and Thomas (2007a, b) , Wen (2011) and Wang and Wen (2009) . Notes: The peaks and troughs show NBER business cycle dates (as of January 2013).
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to investigate, within a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with no nominal price stickiness, the role of inventories in the presence of a stockout constraint, in which no intermediate seller can sell more products to a final goods producer than the inventories they hold, whilst focussing on interplay between output, demand and stockout probability. 3 Our work shows that the introduction of this constraint leads to the model largely satisfying the well-known stylized facts on inventories: production (output) is more volatile than sales; inventory investment is procyclical; and the inventory to sales (I/S) ratio is countercyclical and persistent. 4 Note though our calibrated model with both supply and demand shocks generates lower variability in the inventory to sales ratio and higher variability in inventory investment than in the data, which might imply a larger role for demand shocks than this version of our model allows. The mechanism that our model mimics these facts has already been revealed by Kahn (1987 Kahn ( , 1992 , and, in this sense, our model can be regarded as the general equilibrium extension of his work. Under the stockout constraint, the key trade-off in the inventory management is that having low levels of inventories risks losing sales opportunities but having excess inventories imposes a cost of carry. We briefly review how this trade-off generates the inventory facts in our model.
First, the probability of losing sales opportunity is an increasing function of expected demand, which means that producers -sellers of intermediate goods in our model -need a higher level of inventories in booms, and this explains the first two stylized facts. Looking at this more closely, consider a positive demand shock, 5 in which an increase in demand naturally leads to the same increase in output, in absence of any inventories. But, under a stockout constraint with inventories, producers produce more to accumulate inventories to avoid too high a stockout probability. In this respect, we can treat inventories and demand as "inputs in producing sales," and so these two inputs are complements to each inventories. That is, producers must be compensated by a positive profit margin when their goods are sold; otherwise, they do not want to take the risk of the cost of carry when their goods are unsold; see the discussion of return dominance in Khan and Thomas (2007a) . In Khan and Thomas (2007a) , only if marginal costs are expected to increase to a sufficiently large degree, producers may choose to hold inventories to exploit a negative cost of carry. We argue, however, that such inventories are held not because of the stockout avoidance but because of a production smoothing motive, where producers want to produce their products when their production cost is low and store them in the form of inventories. Note that we do not intend to claim that the stockout model is superior to the (S,s) model; rather, in our opinion, the (S,s) ordering model is more suitable in explaining buyers' inventory management, while our stockout constraint model is actually also suitable for the analysis of sellers' inventory management as well. 6 Our paper also shares several characteristics with Wen (2011) , which develops a "refrigerator" model that assumes the stockout takes place on the buyers side; see also Wang and Wen (2009) which has the similar model environment but focuses more on the production-cost smoothing motive. In Wen (2011) , buyers buy goods, keep them in their refrigerator (or warehouses) and when an unanticipated preference shock takes place they face stockouts for their favorite goods and carry less preferred goods as inventory investments into the next period. This device essentially studies the stockout constraint in a concise way by conflating sellers and buyers, and it allows them to replicate the inventory stylized facts. Unlike his paper, our model however takes the stockout constraint as the sellers' problem and by doing so we can explicitly study the double-sided nature of the stockout constraint. While the inventory management is primarily of sellers under the stockout constraint, the stockout also affects the buyers' side as well. That is, if a seller faces a stockout, it means that there must be at least one buyer who also faces a stockout. Having explicit interaction between sellers and buyers, we can explicitly discuss, for example, the stockout probabilities for sellers and buyers separately. In addition, in our model, we can separate output and sales, and hence we can evaluate the model to assess the relative importance of demand and supply shocks. Also Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2010) consider a sticky wage and price model where firms hold inventories to avoid a stockout in the face of a demand shock; see also Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013) for the role of menu cost in a similar model setup. Their main interest is the role of inventories in explaining impulse response functions (IRFs) to a monetary policy shock and the countercyclicality of the I/S ratio is the focus of their attention. In addition, a new aspect of our research is that, to explore the importance of both the preference and technology shocks, we choose some key parameters based on an idea similar to moment matching, so that we can study the stockout probability as generating gaps between output and sales.
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 shows its simulation results; and finally Section 4 concludes.
The model
This section first outlines the assumptions specific to our model, and then describes the optimization problems of a representative household, final goods firms, and intermediate goods firms in this order. Finally, we discuss the problems of aggregation and equilibrium determination.
Overview and model specific assumptions
This subsection gives an overview of the model. There are three types of agents; a representative household, final goods producers (final firms) and intermediate goods producers (intermediate firms) . The household consumes, invests and supplies labor and capital to intermediate firms. 7 Intermediate firms use labor and capital to produce intermediate goods, which is sold to the final firms in the intermediate goods markets. Final goods firms can be thought of as retailers as they simply convert different types of intermediate goods into identical final goods.
7 Being precise, the distribution of households must have the same dimension as that of final and intermediate firms. Otherwise we would lose consistency; e.g., output (supplied by high dimension agents) cannot be equated to consumption and investment (demanded by a low dimension agent). For our model, this issue can be particularly important, because the dimensionality of agents' distribution is non-standard. However, under the conventional assumptions, such as perfect risk-sharing, all households behave identically. Hence, throughout this paper, we treat households collectively as a representative household to keep our exposition simple.
It is the intermediate goods markets that are subject to the stockout constraint; that is, no intermediate firm can sell more goods than they have on their shelf, even if more buyers than expected appear. Given double-sided nature of the stockout constraint, the optimization problems of these two types of firms are shaped accordingly, while the household's optimization is quite standard. Throughout this paper, a "buyer" and a "seller" are always an intermediate firm and a final firm, respectively.
8 Also, unless confusing, we use "inventories" to signify unsold goods or goods on shelf depending on the context, while "inventory investment" always means the change in unsold goods. Before discussing the agents' optimizations, the rest of this subsection explains two model specific assumptions; (1) distribution of sellers and buyers, which facilitates aggregation, and (2) timing assumption for sellers' decision making, which makes the stockout constraint meaningful.
Distribution of sellers and buyers
As discussed, in the intermediate goods markets, intermediate goods firms (sellers) sell intermediate goods to final goods firms (buyers), but the key friction here is the stockout constraint. Here, we discuss some additional assumptions that make the stockout constraint sensible.
First, the intermediate goods are differentiated á la Dixit-Stiglitz. A positive profit margin is necessary to encourage sellers to have inventories. As discussed further below, the stockout constraint is costly for sellers, because there is always the risk that some goods are unsold. However, if sellers are rewarded by zero profit margin when they sell their goods, there is no incentive for them to hold inventories; see the discussion on the return dominance found in Khan and Thomas (2007b) Also, a buyer (i) visits all markets but (ii) visits only one seller in each market. The former means that on average a seller sees a unit mass of buyers [0, 1] . The latter means that there are always buyers who cannot buy goods due to stockout. That is, assumption (ii) is necessary because, if instead we allow these unlucky buyers to search around other sellers in the same market, they will find goods at the end of the day, meaning that there must be no unsold goods or stockout. This further implies that, under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, stockout is costly not only for sellers but also for buyers. Because the lost varieties cannot be perfectly substituted by other varieties, to produce a certain level of final goods, they have to buy more quantities for available varieties, which leads to an increase in the production cost of final firms.
Given distributions of agents over a rectangle, there are two measures corresponding to two aggregation modes; aggregation within a market and aggregation over the markets. Roughly speaking, a continuum of intermediate firms in each market allows us to aggregate sellers' side, while having infinitely many varieties we can aggregate buyers behavior. For the former, however, the more important assumption for aggregation is constant returns to scale production technology, which we discuss in detail in Section 2.5. For the latter, intuitively, different buyers can buy different sets of varieties, but the measure of available varieties is the same for all buyers.
Idiosyncratic shocks and timing assumption
We think that sellers hold inventories because of the demand uncertainty and in this paper that is captured by an idiosyncratic shock; specifically, the number of buyers ji t N who visit a seller is stochastic and hence is different among sellers. Superscript ji indicates seller j in market i; e.g., ji t N reads the number of buyers who seller j in market i meets at time t. To make the stockout constraint meaningful, we imposes two restrictions on both buyers' and sellers' sides. As already discussed, given double-sided nature of the stockout constraint, the stockout constraint not only affects sellers but also buyers.
On the sellers' side, we assume that each seller must decide both production and price levels before observing his demand shock. More specifically, we have to assume that sellers determine their production before observing , ji t N because otherwise they can adjust their production level to avoid stockout and unsold goods. Similarly, we have to assume that sellers decide their sales price before observing , ji t N which we call "price posting," because otherwise they can adjust their price level so that demand equals goods that they have on shelf. For example, if a seller faces a lot of buyers, he can increase his sales price to exploit his strong demand shock. This increase in price reduces the demand per buyer, but he does not care, because anyway he has too many customers. Similarly, if a seller receives only a few buyers, he can stimulate the demand per buyer by discounting his sales price to avoid the cost of carrying unsold goods to the next period. As a result, no stockout or unsold goods take place without price posting; see our discussion about Khan and Thomas (2007b) in the Introduction.
On the buyers' side, as discussed in the previous subsection, when a buyer cannot buy a variety of goods, we do not allow her to visit other shops; that is, if seller j has too many buyers , ji t N some lucky buyers (say, those on the forepart of the queue) can buy as much as they want, but some unlucky buyers cannot buy the goods at all. 10 This implies that buyers also suffer from the stockout constraint, which leads to an increase in the marginal cost of producing final goods under product differentiation among intermediate goods.
In addition, in our numerical experiments, we also assume that the household decides its labor supply before observing the current period aggregate shocks. This assumption is perhaps reasonable given infrequent nature of labor contract. Even without this, the model captures the inventory behavior at the business cycle frequencies almost equally well. But without this informational assumption, given weak convexity of the cost function of the intermediate firms, our model cannot capture the high frequency behavior of inventory investment in response to unanticipated shocks. 11 In this sense, it seems that the capital adjustment cost in Wen (2011) plays the similar role to our informational imperfection for the labor decision, while having capital adjustment cost tends to yield too low investment volatility; see table 3 in Wen (2011).
Household
The household optimization is quite standard. The infinitely-lived representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility. The household supplies capital and labor, while it demands final goods for consumption and investment:
10 Another possible setup is pro rata allocation of goods to all buyers. However, in this case, anticipating the possibility of stockout, buyers have an incentive to overstate their demand, which complicates the analysis. Also, in this case, the amount that a buyer buys may differ across varieties, which triggers a further complication in aggregation. 11 In our simulation results presented in Table 9 , we allow for changes in these assumptions. 
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The household maximizes the present value of time separable period utility U [.,.] with subjective discount factor β t . For the period utility, we assume that the cross partial is zero ∂ 2 U/∂C t ∂H t = 0. Parameter ψ governs the relative importance of leisure 1-H t , where H t is hours worked in period t, while γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We follow Khan and Thomas (2007a) and introduce a preference shock , C t ξ which follows an AR(1) process. Later, we interpret it as a demand shock. As mentioned above, we assume that households cannot respond to current period aggregate shocks in their labor supply decision.
The first constraint shows the period budget constraint. While the period expense comprises the purchase of final, or retail, goods 
Final goods firms
The role of final goods producers is to convert intermediate goods into final goods using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator: 
Because idiosyncratic shocks determine whether a final firm can buy a variety or not, i t Q differs among buyers. However, the law of large numbers (LLN) guarantees that the value of Q t must be the same for all buyers (final firms). At the same time, Q t also defines the probability that each buyer can buy a certain type of intermediate goods, and hence 1-Q t is the stockout probability for buyers.
12
Second, (4) can be regarded as a quantity index, and one of the possible intermediate goods price indices is:
where , F MC t λ is the marginal cost of final goods production. We have chosen this price index, because this is the "average" price of available intermediate goods,
13
12 As we need some additional notation, we derive this result formally in Section 2.4.1 again. 13 To see this point, consider θ→0 (extremely inelastic, hence fixed demand composite); then,
On the contrary, our quantity index (4) is a sort of "summation." To see this point, consider θ→∞ (perfect substitution); then, .
Note that, unlike the standard demand function, which depends on relative prices alone, there is an additional term /( 1) ,
which is another expression of the inefficiency arising from the stockout constraint. To understand this argument, consider the symmetric equilibrium, in which , / 1, Q M is the physical amount that a final firm buys, because it is the number of available varieties Q t times the quantity , b i t M of each variety actually purchased. Intuitively, as a result of product differentiation, the lack of access to some varieties leads to some inefficiency in production (4), and hence more inputs are required to produce a certain level of .
F t Y
14 In Section 2.5 below, we show that our equilibrium is indeed symmetric.
Fifth and finally, the following two-stage budgeting holds:
Again, the multiplicative term (10) represents the cost of losing varieties. 15 Note that we have shown the cost of stockout on the buyers' side in (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate firms are also subject to the stockout constraint. They take the final firms' demand curve as a constraint; compare (9) and (12d).
The j-th intermediate firm in the i-th market maximizes the present value of current and future net cash inflow. It takes wage W t and return on capital K t R as given (hence no ji superscripts). Section 2.2 defines the stochastic discount factor Λ 0,t .
in the symmetric equilibrium, where , .
The right hand side shows "price" times "quantity actually purchased."
The first constraint shows the stockout constraint for sales; The last constraint shows that the production function is CobbDouglas with capital share α and productivity shock .
M t
ξ We assume that M t ξ follows an AR(1) process.
Deriving some key expressions
Before considering the optimization, we can obtain some key expressions, which are essentially alternative representations of some of the constraints. The discussion in this subsection relies only on (12a) and (12d). To keep our discussion simple, we introduce additional notation:
where ψ is the vector of parameters of the probability density function φ of .
ji t n Later, we limit ψ so that the expected value of , ji t N which must be the total measure of buyers in each market, is normalized to be one. Since the number of buyers cannot be negative, it is natural to take its logarithm. Given this notation, we can rewrite (12a) as
Given these, we define the following three variables: (a) sellers' stockout probability , 16 Recall that Q t appears in the demand curve because of the cost of losing varieties; see (9) . 17 Corresponding to these expressions, we have already obtained (a) buyers' stockout probability, (b) buyers' cost of stockout and (c) varieties available to each buyer in Section 2.3.
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of , 
18 Here, to derive the second line of (15c), we use the normalization assumption: 
Due to LLN, the buyers' probability of not facing stockout Q t equals the number of buyers who can buy the variety in each market, which is the aggregation of ji t N * over j:
Previewing our results, in equilibrium, (i) 
FOCs for intermediate goods firms
Now, we can solve the optimization problem (11) and (12). In (21), the last two FOCs are standard; wage equals marginal product of labor and the net rental rate of capital equals the marginal product of capital where the values of marginal products are evaluated in terms of marginal cost .
MC t λ
The first three FOCs are, however, peculiar to our model. 
,
The first condition (21a) 
The third condition (21c) is with respect to output , .
M j t Y
In a similar manner to (21b), if sold production generates revenue , , 
M ji t Y
24 This crucially depends on the assumption of constant returns 24 Related to this, we would like to note that, although aggregate output is always positive, there is a possibility of having negative production at individual intermediate goods producers' level. Certainly, allowing negative production is counter-intuitive, but there is no inconsistency. Under our timing assumption that they cannot have negative production after observing the demand shock, such a negative production cannot negate the stockout constraint; see Appendix 1.2.5 for further discussion.
to scale (CRS) production, which guarantees that ( 1 ) .
We know that aggregate G t and aggregate U t+1 are simply given by their definitions (12c) and (12b), which are linear. For the other variables, due to the symmetric assumption, we can obtain aggregated variables simply by dropping superscripts j and i.
Equilibrium
The core part of the model has 19 endogenous variables and 19 equations. Because all agents behave symmetrically, we drop off superscript ji in the following. In our model, given the initial condition {U 0 , K 0 }, the proper transversality (non-explosive) (16a), (16b), (18) and (24).
Numerical results
This section describes the quantitative properties of the model. The model developed in Section 2 is numerically simulated by linearizing the equilibrium equations around the non-stochastic steady state; see Section 2.6. Note that aggregate sales S t is a smooth function (though individual sales ji t S are not) and hence it can be linearized. We have two sources of shocks: productivity and preferences. We interpret the former as a supply shock and the latter as a demand shock, although we must be cautious about such labeling.
26 We compare our model performance with US data and a no-inventory version of the model, which is obtained simply by setting σ N = 0. Though there are several minor differences from the standard business cycle models, such as imperfect substitution among varieties, the no-inventory version can be regarded as a variant of the standard business cycle models comparable to the benchmark experiments. Finally, note that, in aggregate, our model falls into the class of the models with representative agents and no aggregate nominal price stickiness. 27 One period in our model is one quarter, and we mainly focus on the business cycle frequencies by using the Baxter-King band-pass filter in obtaining the second moments.
Basic inventory facts
Before examining numerical results, let us remind ourselves of the key inventory facts. 
Inventory investment is procyclical at business cycle frequencies
Following Khan and Thomas (2007b) , we measure inventory investment by dU t+1 /Y t rather than dU t+1 = U t+1 -U t . Note that we cannot take the logarithm of dU t+1 since it can be negative, while, using dU t+1 as it is, the resultant moments are affected by the measurement unit. As the first column of Table 5 shows, if procyclicality is measured by its correlation with output, it is 0.64 at business cycle frequencies and is 0.49 at high frequencies. However, cor{dU t+1 /Y t , S t } at business cycle frequencies is 0.41 (not shown) but -0.42 at high frequencies. As Wen (2005) discussed, this is because inventories work as a buffer at high frequencies. Inventory investment is positively correlated to both output and sales at business cycle frequencies but these correlations differ between output and sales at high frequencies.
Output Y t is more volatile than sales S t
As shown in Table 5 , the ratio of volatilities between output and sales is less than one; σ(S t )/σ(Y t ) = 0.83. This is the same at high frequencies but a lesser extent: σ(S t )/σ(Y t ) = 0.93 (not shown).
I/S ratio is countercyclical and persistent
This fact is reported by Ramey and West (1999) and Wen (2005) . In our notation, inventory-to-sales (I/S) ratio is U t /S t . In our data set, cor{U t /S t , Y t } = -0.52 and cor{U t /S t , U t-1 /S t-1 } = 0.88. This is the same fact that Blinder and Maccini (1991) considered implausible, when implementing a reduced form regression and finding that the adjustment speed of the inventory is quite slow, given the fact that "even the widest swings in inventory stocks amount to no more than a few days of production" (Blinder and Maccini 1991, 81) .
We note that, given the high correlation between output and sales in the data, the traditional inventory facts (1) and (2) at the business cycle frequency essentially restate the same fact from two different angles. This is evident form the law of motion of inventories (25a), taking variances after moving terms, 
Parameter selection and steady state
For the business cycle parameters, we follow conventional values to facilitate the comparison (see Table 2 ), which generate reasonable steady state values (see Table 3 ). In the steady state, consumption and investment are around 80% and 15% of output, respectively. Relative weight for leisure in the utility function is set so that working hours are roughly 1/3 of time endowment. Capital depreciation rate is matched to capital stock/annual GDP ratio, which is around 2.6. For the elasticity of substitution among varieties θ, we set it to be 7.5, which is rather common in the standard New Keynesian models. Steady state stockout probability π ss is mainly affected by θ, and θ = 7.5 generates a plausible stockout probability 8.1% [see Bils (2004) Note: Items with * (ρ M , ρ U , σ C /σ M and σ N ) are estimated by matching to inventory-related second moments. The other parameters are determined so that the steady state values match to the data. Note that η = 1 means that labor supply is determined before observing all aggregate shocks.
28 The key determinant of π ss is the net profit margin. For example, we can have the same stockout probability by instead adding annual convenience yield 1.3% of inventories with θ = 10.0, which generates the almost same quantitative results as our benchmark model. To see the effects of inventories, we experiment with several sizes of idiosyncratic shocks σ N = {0.00, 0.40, 1.73}, where σ N = 0.0 is essentially the real business cycle model, and σ N = 0.4, which leads to inventory-to-sales ratio U ss /S ss = 0.66 (around 2 months) in the steady state; see Table 6 for the results with σ N = 0.4. In data, inventory-to-sales ratio is roughly 2 months; see Bils (2004) for example. We have chosen σ N = 1.73 by matching the key inventory moments, which we discuss further in the next subsection. In our numerical experiments, we mainly consider the model behavior with σ N = 1.73 rather than targeting a particular value of U ss /S ss , because (i) there is no service sector in this model and (ii) there are aspects of the stockout problem that we do not model such as the reputation cost of a stockout. For σ N = 1.73, U ss /S ss is 4.2 quarters; as σ N becomes higher, the unsold goods in the steady state becomes greater. Because of the cost of losing varieties (Q ss = 0.63, i.e., the buyers' stockout probability is 37%), the intermediate goods price is strictly lower than the final goods price in the steady state; 0.93.
M ss P = The effects of changing σ N are discussed in Section 3.5.1.
In terms of the exogenous shock processes, because sales are not necessarily equal to output in our model, our model has relative advantage to investigate the relative importance of demand and supply shocks. 29 In this respect, we fix the parameters of exogenous shock processes together with the size of idiosyncratic shock σ N so that key model moments match the data moments in Section 3.3. Finally, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, we assume that labor supply cannot respond to the current period aggregate shocks.
30 This is because otherwise if production can respond to all aggregate shocks, the model cannot generate a sudden decline in the inventory holdings right after a demand shock at aggregate level. 31 Even if all information is available for labor supply decision, inventory facts are satisfied in aggregate almost equally well at business cycle frequencies, but inventories work little as a buffer stock. To see its importance quantitatively, Section 3.5.2 discusses the effect of changing this information assumption.
Target moments and selected parameters
To pin down the parameters of aggregate supply, aggregate demand and idiosyncratic shocks, we choose the parameter values of these shock processes to minimize the (weighted) sum of squared gaps of the seven key moments between the model and the US data. Note that, in our stochastic simulations, the generated second moments are also stochastic; hence, we put more weights on the moments that are simulated more precisely in the stochastic simulations, see Appendix A.3 for more details. This method is in spirit similar to Crucini residual method as employed in Khan and Thomas (2007a) .
The four key parameters to be "estimated" are: the AR(1) coefficient on the demand shock ρ C , the AR(1) coefficient on the supply shock ρ M , the ratio of the standard deviations of the innovations to both shocks σ C /σ M and the size of the idiosyncratic shocks σ N . In terms of the target moments to be matched, we have two groups. First, as we are interested in the relative importance of demand and supply shocks, we found that it is useful to target (i) the contemporaneous correlation between wages and output cor{W, Y} and (ii) the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption relative to that of output sd(C)/sd(Y). It is well-known, for example, that the correlation of wage to output is near +1 if the shock is on the supply side, while it is almost -1 for the demand shock; see Bencivenga 1992 for example. Analogously, it is well-known that the variance of consumption to output is less in the 30 This plays a similar role of the capital adjustment cost in Wen (2011) . However, given strong crowding out effect that we are going to discuss in Section 3.4, it leads to too low variability of capital investment; see table 3 in Wen (2011) . Setting aside the model performance, we also believe, given infrequent labor contract, assuming information imperfection in labor supply seems to be relatively safe choice in adding an aggregate real rigidity. 31 The idiosyncratic shock is unanticipated but it is integrated out in aggregation. Note also that information assumption does not affect the non-stochastic steady state. standard business cycle model when supply shocks dominate demand. Examine the columns under the label of Benchmark (σ N = 1.73) in Table 5 to assess the difference between the model based on the demand or supply shocks alone.
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The second group is simply motivated by the following inventory facts; output is more volatile than sales; inventory investment is procyclical; inventory-to-sales ratio is countercyclical and persistent. For the correlation between inventory investment (as percentage of GDP) and output, we focus on cor{dU/Y, Y} at higher frequencies because, as Wen (2005) reported, the cyclicality of the inventory investment is expected to be very different between demand and supply shocks at high frequencies. On the other hand, at business cycle frequencies, cor{dU/Y, Y} and cor{dU/Y, S} are almost same, given very high correlation between output Y and sales S.
The resultant parameter values and moments are listed in Table 4 . First, we find that the idiosyncratic shock is relatively large (σ N = 1.73); compare Tables 5 and 6 to see its effects. As discussed above, this large value is necessary to 32 Note that Table 1 is not directly comparable with Table 5 because the former employs a filter, while the latter uses growth rates. Note: *indicates that the high band-pass filter of 2-4 quarters is applied and, for the others, the business cycle band-pass filter of 8-40 quarters is applied.
generate sufficiently large inventory fluctuations in our model. Second, both shocks are fairly persistent. Third, the ratio of the innovations to the supply and demand shocks is 0.504:1. Also, since supply shock is less persistent, the ratio of supply and demand shock volatilities is 0.228:1. In this nave comparison, the supply shock is much less volatile than the demand shock.
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For the third point above, however, it is premature to conclude that the supply shock is less important than the demand shock. Actually, as shown in our numerical results in Table 5 , output volatility is almost one half with demand shock only than with supply shock only. This is not surprising because the supply shock directly affects output, and indeed if instead we focus on the consumption volatility it is greater for the demand shock than for the supply shock. In terms of cor{W, Y} and sd(C)/sd(Y), the data moments are both near the simple average between supply shock only and demand shock only cases. All in all, in our model, it seems that the supply and demand shocks are almost equally important.
Simulation results
We find that adding the stockout constraint does not worsen the performance of our model in mimicking the business cycle facts and can help explain the inventory facts fairly well. To capture the essence, we would like to introduce simplified, though not exact, demand equations. Since the effects via Q t is quantitatively small, ignoring the cost of losing varieties (i.e., keeping Q t = 1 so that
, we can rewrite (2b), (12) and (16c) as:
where note that (25c) schematically captures the fact that goods on shelf M Also, (9) and (18) 
Standard business cycle facts
In terms of working hours, our model performs similarly to the standard business cycle model. Hours are less volatile than output for the supply shock and vice versa for the demand shock. Wage and labor productivity are almost perfectly positively correlated to output M t Y for the supply shock. In contrast, with the demand shock, it is almost perfectly negatively correlated to ,
as found in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for government expenditure shock and Bencivenga (1992) for preference shock. For both shocks, capital investment is as volatile as the data, 35 although it is slightly less volatile for the demand shock, because it is crowded out by consumption. The volatility of investment is too high in the no-inventory case because inventories compete with capital in the sense that the former generates sales while the latter generates output. In a sense, inventory and capital investments also crowd out each other to some extent.
To see these crowding-out among capital investment I t , inventory investment U t+1 -U t and consumption C t , see Figure 1 . Under ρ C = 0.944, capital investment goes below the steady state level after a a positive preference (demand) shock, while, at the date when the shock hits, inventory investment works as a buffer. On the quantity side, (25a) implies that, given output, a higher consumption implies either lower capital or inventory investments or both. On the price side, we can see the increase in interest rate from the mid left panel of Figure 1 , implying that the cost of borrowing for investment and the Jorgenson's user costs for inventories both increase after a positive preference shock. Hence, from these two aspects, the crowding-out can be explained. The key parameter here is ρ C ; if we set, say, ρ C = 0.990, capital investment increases significantly after a positive preference shock. In this case, although the real interest increases more sharply, because the consumption is expected to be strong for a longer period, capital investment increases by increasing output M t Y sharply. Hence, the shape of IRF of I t is very sensitive to ρ C , which holds even in the no-inventory case.
Traditional two inventory facts
For both supply and demand shocks, production is more volatile than sales, and inventory investment is procyclical (see Table 5 ). With the supply shock, it is hardly surprising because the source of shocks lies in the production sector. In our model, however, even with the demand shock, production is more vola- tile than sales. To see this, consider the upper left panel of Figure 1 . First, right after a positive preference (demand) shock, the inventory investment decreases, simply because intermediate goods producers use inventories as a buffer to accommodate a sudden increase in demand. As discussed in Section 2.4.2, inventories also work as a buffer stock in our model, even without the idiosyncratic shock (σ N = 0). 36 Subsequently, however, inventory investment increases, because, in generating sales, inventories and demand are compliments as discussed in Section 2.4.1. To capture a strong demand, intermediate goods firms want to 36 Looking into inventory behavior, we find that inventories work as a buffer mainly because of our information assumption that labor supply cannot react to the current period aggregate shocks. Under our function and parameter assumptions, the effects of intertemporal substitution on the production side are quite weak. In other words, though it is surely working, the production smoothing due to a convex cost is quantitatively very weak in our model. accumulate inventories (which we call distributors' demand), they must produce more than what they sell: see also (43).
37
As a result, as previously reported and discussed by Wen (2005) , if we apply a high-frequency filter, we find cor{dU/Y, S} = -0.42 and cor{dU/Y, Y} = 0.49 in the US data; see Table 5 . This captures the buffer stock behavior of inventories. However, at the business cycle frequencies, the distributors' demand plays a more important role, which adds demands on top of consumption and capital investment; see (25b). Hence, as reported in Table 5 , cor{dU/Y, Y} is 0.98 and 0.47 for supply and demand shocks respectively; i.e., inventory investment is procyclical in business 37 Actually, distributors' demand works even for a positive productivity shock, as long as it leads to an increase in demand, although productivity shocks can mimic the two traditional inventory facts without the help of this mechanism. In addition, as shown in the upper left panel of Figure 2 , mainly because capital investment increases sharply, to accommodate this initial strong demand, inventory investment decreases slightly right after a positive supply shock. 
Band pass filter with 2-4 quarters ,
Notes: The rel sd and corr are standard deviation relative to that of output (total intermediate production) and correlation with GDP, respectively, except for rel sd of Y M which shows the sd of intermediate production. The main sources of US data are US NIPA and current employment statistics from 1975Q1-2010Q3. R B is effective Fed Funds rate (FRED2), and P M is PPI for final goods. Note that U/S is taken from M3, US Census Bureau, while the inventory investment in dU/Y M is from NIPA. The band-pass filter (8-40 quarters) is applied with a maximum lag length of K = 12. 
Note: See the notes on Table 5 .
cycle frequencies for both shocks but our model generate a little too much variance as we calibrate on a relatively high contribution from supply shocks. At first glance, these findings lead us to postulate that inventories suppress the effects of demand shocks at high frequencies but amplifies them at business cycle frequencies. However, we actually find that this is not the case and discuss this in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
Var U Y U Y Var U U
+ + = In essence, the volatilities of I/S ratio and inventory investment both tend to decrease as the idiosyncratic shock increases, mainly because it leads to (a) a lower demand volatility and (b) a higher buffer inventory level. Indeed, in the neighbor of our parameter values, Var[dU t+1 /U ss ] and Var[U t+1 /S t ] are both decreasing in σ N .
39 Also, even if we match the steady state I/S ratio to the data (i.e., the case with σ N = 0.4), both the I/S ratio and inventory investment are less volatile than the data, meaning that, although our model can explain a significant portion of the inventory behavior, it does not explain it fully.
Intermediate goods price, markups and elasticity of substitution
In this model, we have two markup concepts / M U t t P λ and / M M C t t P λ 40 that are both positively correlated with output (see Table 5 ) with their impulse response functions almost identical shapes to each other though different magnitude (see Figures 1 and 2) . This is because the effective elasticity of substitution t θ is countercyclical for both shocks; see (22) for the definition of . t θ The intuition of this is closely related to that of I/S ratio. That is, interest rate B t R tends to be higher in booms, which leads to a higher cost of carry of unsold goods U t+1 , meaning that the optimal inventory holdings relative to sales becomes lower. To reduce the risk of having their goods unsold, intermediate goods firms accept a high stockout probability π t and a concomitant loss of sales opportunities . t π Because the effects of Q t , which is low in booms, are quantitatively small under our parameter setting, the behavior of t θ is dominated by . t π In data, the evidence on the mark-up is inconclusive. For example, Martins and Scarpetta (1999) are supportive of a procyclical markup, 41 while Small (1997) and Nishimura, Ohkusa, and Ariga (1999) find some evidence of a countercyclical markup; others such as Marchetti (2002) draw an indefinite conclusion. See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) among others for the importance of the cyclicality of markup in optimal monetary policy settings.
Effects of changing parameters
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of changing three parameters: (i) the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks σ N ; (ii) the share of observable component in the aggregate shocks η; and (iii) the persistence of the exogenous shocks ρ C and ρ M . We investigate the effects of changing σ N and η, not only to check the robustness but also to draw some implications on the causes of the Great Moderation. In addition to the two leading explanations -good monetary policy and good luck - Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) suggest that the increase in output stability observed since around 1980 in the US may be due to the improvement in inventory management, which may have been induced by new IT technologies. In our model, improved inventory management can be 40 The latter (sales price/marginal cost) is the standard definition of markup in the absence of inventories. But, with inventories, (21b) and (21c) imply that it is the shadow price of unsold goods U t λ that corresponds to the concept of the "cost of sales" in accounting. In this sense, / Bils and Kahn (2000) .
interpreted as a lower σ N and more information available at the timing of labor supply decision.
In accounting for the reduction of the volatility of total output, Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) reports the following key observations started at around early 1980s; (i) output volatility has decreased, which can be partly explained by the reduction in sales volatility; (ii) in light of the evolution of inventories, the reduction of output volatility relative to sales volatility is mainly accounted for by the decreases in both inventory investment volatility and correlation between inventory investment and sales; (iii) the level and the fluctuation of I/S ratio have declined. Our Tables 7-9 effectively correspond to their variance decomposition using the equations equivalent to (43) and (44); see Appendix A.5. (28) and (29). The SS adjustment (E) shows the adjustment for the trend changes (lack of the steady state) in dU/Y M over time in the data, which is eliminated by the band-pass filter. Other terms (I) include terms related to Q t for the model simulations and terms related to net exports and government expenditure for the US data. Finally note that durable consumption is included in capital investment I t , rather than consumption C t . Table 8 shows that changes in σ N have little effect on output volatility in our model under either shock. On the one hand, given demand volatility, lower σ N reduces the volatility of inventory investment and its correlation with sales; hence, for both shocks, output volatility relative to sales volatility increases as σ N increases. In this sense, our model captures the intuition that Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) suggested. On the other hand, however, the volatility of sales increases when σ N is low. This is because of the crowding out as discussed above. In booms, inventory investment increases (to exploit strong demand), which suppresses consumption and capital investment given resource constraint (43). However, as σ N decreases, the effects of this crowding out decreases and as a result the volatility of consumption and capital investment increases. Because of these two offsetting effects, the total effect is not monotone. See also Table 6 for other aspects of changing σ N .
Idiosyncratic shocks σ N

Information available to labor supply decision
Let us also consider the information available at the timing of the labor supply decision. It is straightforward to decompose shock ξ t into observable component Table 9 , we set η as 0 (full information), 0.5 (50% aggregate shocks are observable for labor supply decision) and 1.0 (labor supply is decided before observing the current period aggregate shocks, benchmark). As is clear from Table 9 , there is little impact on the variance decomposition. In our model setting, this information affects mainly the high frequency inventory behavior and not the model behavior at business cycle frequencies. Note that, since the information assumption is irrelevant to the non-stochastic steady state, I/S ratio at the steady state is not affected by η.
Closer investigation tells us a bit more of the story. First, a lack of information has a direct effect on output volatility; since labor supply cannot react to unobservable shocks, the lack of information directly suppresses output volatility. Second, however, for example, right after a positive demand shock (which is captured by high-frequency filtered moments), less responsive labor supply causes a drop in inventory investment. Hence, in the subsequent periods, production must increase so that inventories catch up with sales. This distributors' demand increases the procyclicality of inventory investment in the business cycle frequencies. These two effects offset each other, leading to little effects in total. Note: See notes on Table 7 . Table 2 . In this experiment, capital stock is fixed at its steady state level and investment is equal to capital depreciation. Also, the band pass filter picks up the fluctuations at 2-40 quarters. Hence, some autocorrelations are not the same as in Table 5 . the other hand, sales is persistent, because of consumption smoothing. Rather than consuming a sudden increase in output at one time, such an increase in output is stored in the form of inventories. Hence, inventories as a buffer stock generate persistent sales from i.i.d. supply shocks. These exercises show that buffer stock inventories not only insulate production from demand shocks but also insulate demand from supply shocks in general equilibrium. Finally, with i.i.d. shocks, the correlation between output and sales is much lower, and, because inventories gradually return back to the steady state level, the I/S ratio is persistent.
Non-persistent shocks
Summary of numerical results
In terms of the business cycle facts, our model inherits most of the features from the standard real business cycle model. The only difference is a less volatile capital investment than a standard model, because inventory investment competes with capital investment and crowd outs in some degree, allowing a better, though slightly, fit with the US data.
With specific reference to the basic inventory facts, the model performs well. The key intuition is distributors' demand. Since the target level of inventories is increasing in demand, if there is one unit of increase in demand, the target level of inventories becomes higher. Hence, after a positive demand shock, inventory investment becomes positive (procyclical inventory investment), and output must increase more than sales to accumulate inventories. Because of this, the inventory behavior is strongly affected by the expected demand. The behavior of inventories relative to sales is mainly affected by interest rate (through the cost of carry of inventories). We find that in booms with high interest rates, sellers optimally choose a lower I/S ratio by accepting high stockout probability, which leads to both countercyclical and persistent I/S ratio.
In our discussion, the existence of inventories (due to the stockout constraint) may seem to amplify shocks at first glance, which is true only given size of the demand fluctuations. However, in general equilibrium, where demand is also endogenous, inventory investment crowds out capital investment, and to a lesser decree consumption as well. Hence, an increase in inventory investment in boom suppresses the increases in capital investment and consumption; as a result, inventory investment suppresses the volatility of sales (demand). In this respect, it is fair to say that, certainly, our model captures most of the mechanism discussed by Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) , our model does not provide strong support for the hypothesis that improvements in inventory management have reduced GDP volatility.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate a dynamic general equilibrium model with a stockout constraint faced by intermediate goods producers. The stockout constraint means that, even if demand is strong, sellers cannot sell more than the goods on shelf that they have. Because of this, to generate sales, sellers need inventories; i.e., sellers hold inventories to overcome the constraint when they distribute their goods. The key trade-off is that (a) having too few inventories is costly because it leads to too high a stockout probability, while (b) having too much inventories is also costly because it leads to too high a cost of carrying inventories. The former implies that the optimal level of inventories is increasing in demand, which explains why inventory investment is procyclical. In booms, sellers have to produce not only to accommodate strong demand but also to accumulate inventories to generate sales, which we call distributors' demand because sellers need inventories to dis-tribute their products to buyers. In the presence of the stockout constraint, hence, one unit of increase in demand leads to more than one unit of increase in output. The latter implies that the optimal level of inventories relative to sales is strongly affected by interest rate (cost of carry), which explain why inventory to sales ratio is persistent and countercyclical; see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) .
Note that the above observations hold mainly at business cycle frequencies. For high frequency behavior, our model also naturally incorporates the production smooth motivation of inventories, where sellers want to avoid volatile production paths given convex cost function. That is, sellers allow inventories to decline right after an unanticipated demand shock, which is captured by the negative correlation between inventory investment and sales at high frequencies; see Wen (2005) . Also, at first glance, it might be tempted to conclude that the distributors' demand discussed above may amplify the output volatility. In our model, certainly, given demand fluctuations, the stockout constraint amplifies it; production is more volatile than sales. The mechanism behind it is almost the same as what Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) argue in explaining the Great Moderation. However, because of the resource constraint, having more inventories crowds out capital investment and consumption. Hence, as shown in our numerical experiment, as we reduce the effects of the stockout constraint, the lower crowding out effect raises the demand volatility. In total, we see (a) output volatility relative to sales decreases, but (b) the volatility of sales increases. All in all, under our model setup and parameters, improving inventory management cannot explain the Great Moderation.
The most closely related work to our model is Wen (2011) , where he treats the stockout constraint as buyers' problem by conflating demand and supply sides, which keeps his model simple. In contrast, we explicitly consider the doublesided nature of the stockout constraint from the perspective of both sellers and buyers. Here, we emphasize that the stockout constraint is the inventory management problem of sellers. In our view, while an (S,s) model may be suitable to study inventories on the buyers' side, the stockout model allows us to focus on the sellers' inventory management problem as well. Because of this, for example, we can explicitly investigate the stockout probabilities of sellers and buyers separately. More importantly, however, our analysis explains why Khan and Thomas (2007a) find very different results from ours as well as Wen's (2011) . In their seminal paper, they find that, while their (S,s) ordering model is successful in explaining inventory facts, their version of the stockout constraint model fails to generate a sufficiently high average inventory level, which means that it cannot explain business cycle fluctuations, as opposed to our numerical analysis of the contribution of inventories to business cycle fluctuations. By explicitly analyzing sellers and buyers separately, we show that it is important to assume (1) a small degree of price inflexibility, 43 (iii) production decision before observing demand shocks and (ii) positive net profit margin. For (i) and (ii), as discussed in Section 2.1.2, the stockout constraint is negated by either price adjustment or production adjustment after observing demand shocks; sellers have to hold inventories because of demand uncertainty, but such uncertainty has no effects if either of them is possible. For (iii), while to accept the risk of incurring the cost of carrying inventories, sellers must be compensated by positive profit when goods are sold; zero profit margin means that the return on inventory investment is negative in expectation.
Finally, as shown in our analytical and numerical results, the interest rate plays a key roll in determining the behavior of inventories and markups (via the user cost of inventories). Although monetary policy is absent in our model, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggest, inventories may have an important interaction with monetary policy. 44 Indeed, given the extensive recent development of dynamic macroeconomic models to incorporate financial spreads, it has not escaped our attention that inventory management may play an important role in the monetary policy transmission but we leave this question to future research. demand shock, roughly speaking, the worst possible state is that a seller or producer observes zero buyers. In this case, this producer is forced to carry all of his products to the next period as unsold goods. If hypothetically the optimal target of the goods on shelf is unchanged, the unsold goods carried from the previous period already meet this target in the next period as well, meaning that his optimal production is zero at t+1. In stochastic simulations, however, the optimal goods on shelf is a function of mainly aggregate expected sales and interest rate (via the cost of carry), and hence it changes over time. Thus, there is a possibility of having negative production at the individual producer's level, especially when the aggregate demand is lower than the previous period. However, we argue that this is not a significant problem, especially for the aggregate behavior of the model. First, production never becomes negative in aggregate. Second, given our persistent aggregate shocks, such negative production at individual producer level is small in magnitude. Third, it is possible to eliminate negative production by assuming a distribution function with some positive lower bound (such as uniform) for the idiosyncratic shock. Indeed, an earlier version of this paper employed a uniform distribution for the idiosyncratic shocks, but there was no sensible difference given the linearization technique in our simulations, although the algebraic expression becomes messier with a uniform distribution. Finally, certainly, allowing negative production is counter-intuitive, but there is no internal inconsistency. Under our timing assumption that the production decision is made before observing the idiosyncratic shock, unsold goods cannot be liquidated by producing a negative amount, meaning that some sellers still have to carry their unsold goods to the next period.
G Y
S M = = = (iii) buyers can achieve their purchasing index M ji M C t t P λ = = ( = final goods price), and (v) although stockout always takes place, stockout does not have any importance for both sellers and buyers. Since all other parts of the equilibrium are the same as the standard business cycle model, this completes the sketch of the proof. These results hold for a general class of distribution functions of the idiosyncratic shock.
A. 3 Moments for parameter selection
We implement our parameter selection as follows. First, let θ be the vector of parameters to be pinned down. Then, depending on the actual value of θ, the model generates a given set of moments m(θ), where we explicitly write the moments as functions of parameters. In the stochastic simulation with a finite simulation period (142 quarters, which is the same as our data length), m(θ) has some distribution. Letting H -1 (θ) be the variance and covariance of m(θ) in this stochastic simulation, we use its inverse as weights to allocate the relative importance of the target moments. If, for example, hypothetically H -1 (θ) is diagonal (that is where there is no correlation among moments), then the weights are simply equivalent to the precision of each estimate; i.e., we put a higher weight on a moment that is more precisely measured. Hence, given ( ), H θ we choose θ that minimizes the following quadratic form 
